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ABSTRACT 
The paper analyses venture capitalists’ selection process in biotechnology ventures. 
Biotech ventures operate in an extremely risky environment making this an interesting 
research setting. The majority of venture capitalists exclude certain biotech sectors ex-ante 
because of regulatory uncertainty, the long development process to a market ready product 
and the difficulty to understand the technology. The more thorough due diligence process 
focusses on financial, market and technology criteria. Management team capabilities are 
more important for later stage investors, whereas early stage investors expect to have an 
impact on the future recruiting of professional managers. Despite the higher risk of biotech 
investments, we find no evidence that VCs require higher hurdle rates or more complete 
contracts for these investments, compared to investments in other technology-based 
companies. The most important reason for not reaching an investment agreement is 
disagreement over valuation, due to large differences in risk perception between 
entrepeneurs and venture capitalists and the lack of a standard valuation tool for biotech 
projects. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
All projects that create value find sufficient and adequate financing in perfect 
financial markets. Real world financial markets, however, are far from perfect. In the 
presence of market imperfections, investors may ration capital and value creating projects 
may be denied financing or only be able to obtain certain types of funding1. As a special 
type of new technology ventures, biotechnology companies may find it even harder to get 
financing2. First, biotech - especially biopharmaceutical companies - are characterised by a 
long development process and the high cash burn rates necessitate large investments3. 
Biotech is therefore perceived as one of the riskiest industries in our modern economy4. 
Second, regulatory uncertainty and a negative public opinion may hamper the search for 
financing5. Finally, the biotech technology and product development process are 
considered to be very complex6.  
The very nature of venture capital companies (VCs) as financial intermediaries is 
to reduce information asymmetries and act in uncertain environments7. Venture capital is 
therefore an important source of funding for biotech companies, especially when large 
investment amounts are needed8. In this paper we qualitatively study the biotechnology 
investment decision process of VCs. The biotech sector is chosen because it is an 
interesting setting to study the supply of financing under extreme circumstances. Our 
research question is: How do VCs handle the selection of investment proposals in 
biotechnology ventures? Does it differ from the selection process in other technology 
ventures?9 
 
 
1
 Guiso L. (1998) "High-tech firms and credit rationing" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 35 (1): 39-59. 
2
 Following segments are considered as biotech within the current paper: bio-pharmaceutical and biomedical (e.g. drug discovery, drug 
development and medical devices), services and technology platforms (e.g. bio-informatics, high throughput screening and contract 
research organisations), bio-agro-alimentary and bio-environmental. 
3
 Brierley P. (2001) "The financing of technology-based small firms: a review of the literature" Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 41 
(1): 64-76. 
4
 Senker J. (1998) Biotechnology and competitive advantage, Edward Elgar Publisher. 
5
 Bower J.D. (2004) “Changes in biotechnology companies' strategic positioning.” Conference proceedings, 12th Annual International 
High-Technology Small Firms Conference at the University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands. 
6
 Brierley P. (2001) "The financing of technology-based small firms: a review of the literature" Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 41 
(1): 64-76. 
7 Amit R., Brander J., and Zott C (1998) "Why do venture capital firms exist? Theory and Canadian evidence " Journal of Business 
Venturing, 13 (6): 441-466. 
8
 Manigart S. and Struyf C. (1997) "Financing high technology start ups in Belgium: an explorative study" Small Business Economics, 
9 (2): 125-135. 
9
 “Risk is a situation in which probabilities are taken as given by everyone, whereas in a situation of uncertainty there is no general 
agreement about what the probabilities are or even whether they exist” (Hey, 2002, pp. 20). Hey J.D. (2002) “Experimental economics 
and the theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty.” The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 27 (1): 5-21. 
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Previous research indicates that VCs have different mechanisms to deal with risk 
or uncertainty in their selection process (Figure 1). First, VCs define their overall 
investment strategy. During the screening phase VCs check whether the investment 
proposal fits the VCs’ portfolio strategy.  
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
Second, VCs use thorough due diligence to reduce adverse selection and 
information asymmetry problems. Well performed screening and due diligence should 
lead to VCs financing the most valuable companies10. There is no consensus in the 
literature with respect to which criteria are most important in the investment decision of 
VCs. On the one hand, studies highlight the importance of the entrepreneurial 
management team as the most important factor. MacMillan et al. (1985, pp. 119), for 
example, argue that “There is no question that irrespective of the horse (product), horse 
race (market), or odds (financial criteria), it is the jockey (entrepreneur) who 
fundamentally determines whether the venture capitalist will place a bet at all”11. Other 
studies stress on the other hand that the investment decision of VCs does not depend on 
one criterion, but that a combination of criteria is important. Fried & Hisrich (1994), for 
example, argue that not only the entrepreneur, but also the concept and potential return 
play a crucial role in the screening of investment proposals12.  
Third, VCs may require higher hurdle rates for valuation purposes to take into 
account higher risk or uncertainty. Previous research points out that higher (perceived) 
technological risk increases the hurdle rate, i.e. the return potential that must be present in 
a proposal before it is considered as attractive13,14. Finally, VCs may shift risk or 
uncertainty from the VC to the entrepreneur through contracting. To reduce agency risk 
VCs may write more comprehensive contracts, i.e. contracts with more and more complete 
contract specifications, more use of preferred and/or convertible stock and a better 
 
 
10
 Zacharakis A.L. and Meyer G.D. (2000) "The potential of actuarial decision models: Can they improve the venture capital investment 
decision?" Journal of Business Venturing, 15 (4): 323-346.  
11
 MacMillan I.C., Siegel R., and Subbanarasimha P.N.S. (1985) "Criteria used by venture capitalists to evaluate new venture 
proposals" Journal of Business Venturing, 1 (1): 119-128. 
12
 Fried V.H. and Hisrich R.D. (1994) "Towards a model of venture capital investment decision making" Financial Management, 23 
(3): 28-37. 
13
 
Murray G.C. and Lott J. (1995) "Have UK venture capitalists a bias against investment in new technology-based firms?" Research Policy, 24 (2): 283-299. 
14
 
Lockett A., Murray G.C., and Wright M. (2002)  "Do UK venture capitalists still have a bias against investment in new technology firms?" Research Policy, 31 (6): 
1009-1030. 
 6
alignment of management incentives through appropriate remuneration and bonding 
strategies15,16,17.   
Even though the very nature of VCs is to reduce information asymmetries and act 
in uncertain environments, it is documented that the selection criteria of a VC are different 
for non-technology-based proposals compared to technology-based proposals. UK VCs for 
example require higher hurdle rates and stress the need to address a larger market for 
technology-based companies18. Moreover, technology is seen as a more important risk 
factor than stage of development by UK VCs19. Therefore, we will stress the difference 
between biotech investments and other technology related investments in the current 
paper, rather than compare biotech investments with non-tech investments. 
We find that the first way to cope with high uncertainty is embedded in the VCs’ 
investment strategy. The majority of investors exclude investments in certain biotech 
segments because of regulatory uncertainty, the long time to develop technology into a 
market ready product and the difficulty to understand technology and product 
development. The due diligence process is more thorough for biotech companies 
compared to other technology-based companies. While previous literature stresses the 
entrepreneurial management team as most important investment criterion, we find that 
financial, technology and market criteria are more important in our setting, especially for 
early stage proposals. Management is important for later stage investments, however. This 
is explained by the development process of biotech companies: during the early stages 
technological progress is more important, whereas management and sales skills become 
more important as the company further develops. As a result, early stage investors are 
willing to invest in incomplete management teams as long as the scientists are willing to 
change positions as the company develops.  
Our results further indicate that VCs do not consider the standard valuation tools to 
be appropriate for valuing biotech companies. They rely more heavily on qualitative data 
than on quantitative methods. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, VCs do not require 
higher hurdle rates for biotech investments compared to other technology-based 
 
 
15
 Brierley P. (2001) "The financing of technology-based small firms: a review of the literature" Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 41 
(1): 64-76. 
16
 Kaplan S.N. and Strömberg P. (2003) "Financial contracting theory meets the real world: An empirical analysis of venture capital 
contracts" Review of Economic Studies, 70 (2): 281-315. 
17
 Van Osnabrugge M. (2000) "A comparison of business angel and venture capitalist investment procedures: an agency theory-based 
analysis" Venture Capital, 2 (2): 91-109. 
18
 
Murray G.C. and Lott J. (1995) "Have UK venture capitalists a bias against investment in new technology-based firms?" Research Policy, 24 (2): 283-299. 
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investments. This may be explained by the fact that increasing the hurdle rate may 
increase the risk of adverse selection, inducing the best projects to seek money from 
cheaper sources. Moreover, contrary to the predictions of agency theory, we find no 
evidence that VCs require more complete contracts. This might indicate that it is not 
agency risk that increases the risk of biotech investments, compared to other technology-
based companies.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The second section describes 
the method used in the study and the VC sector in Belgium. Section three gives an 
overview of the typical characteristics of a biotech investment proposal from the 
perspective of a VC. Section four describes how VCs deal with the distinctive biotech 
characteristics in their selection process. Finally, section five concludes and offers avenues 
for future research. We end with propositions that can be more formally tested in the 
future. 
 
2 METHOD AND RESEARCH SETTING 
Given the lack of in-depth insight in the selection process of biotech proposals, we 
opt for a qualitative research design. Data are collected through semi-structured interviews 
and questionnaires. Both interview guide and questionnaire are pre-tested with two sector 
specialists. We use interviews as a data collection method for several reasons. First, our 
pre-test indicated that VCs are not always willing to return comprehensive mail surveys 
but prefer face-to-face interviews. It is often necessary to establish a relationship with the 
venture capital manager before receiving a response20. Second, research based solely on 
mail questionnaires may fail to obtain the full essence of a VC’s investment process21. It 
is, for example, difficult to get comprehensive answers on unprompted questions22. We 
supplement the interviews with a structured questionnaire, which includes both hard data 
on, for example, fund characteristics and investment criteria and Likert scales.  
 
 
19
 
Lockett A., Murray G.C., and Wright M. (2002)  "Do UK venture capitalists still have a bias against investment in new technology firms?" Research Policy, 31 (6): 
1009-1030. 
20
 Bruton G.D. and Ahlstrom D. (2003) "An institutional view of China's venture capital industry - Explaining the differences between 
China and the West" Journal of Business Venturing, 18 (2): 233-259. 
21
 Wright M. and Robbie K. (1998) "Venture capital and private equity: a review and synthesis"  Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 25 (5-6): 521-570. 
22
 
Murray G.C. and Lott J. (1995) "Have UK venture capitalists a bias against investment in new technology-based firms?" Research Policy, 24 (2): 283-299. 
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The Likert scales, covering the pre-investment mechanisms which VCs may use to 
handle risk or uncertainty, are based on previous research23,24. The interviews provide 
qualitative insights into how VCs use these mechanisms. 
All interviews are done with Belgian venture capital managers between October 
2003 and February 2004. In contrast with the US and the UK where most studies on 
venture capital are done, Belgium has a Continental European financial system. The 
venture capital industry is nevertheless quite well developed in Belgium compared to other 
European countries25. Figure 2 gives an overview of venture capital biotech investments in 
Belgium and the UK -Europe’s most developed venture capital market- as a percentage of 
GDP from 1999 to 2003. Biotech investments are high in Belgium compared to the UK, 
except in 2003. This shows that Belgian VCs are active in the biotech sector and that the 
research setting is appropriate to study the investment behaviour of Continental European 
VCs. The major players within the Belgian venture capital sector are independent VCs, 
public sector VCs and semi-captives, with respectively 62%, 17% and 12% of the total 
number of investments in 200326. 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
The population of Belgian biotech VCs is identified by using publications, trade 
directories and snowball sampling. We estimate that the total population of Belgian VCs 
with a potential interest in biotech proposals amounts to 25 of which 16 (64%) are 
included in the sample. There is a good balance between early stage and later stage VCs in 
our sample, ranging from seed financing specialists to pre-IPO investors (Table 1, Panel 
A), but most VCs have a broad investment strategy covering several stages of 
development. Eight out of sixteen VCs are independent and private. There are two 
independent quoted VCs, three university related VCs, two bank related VCs and one 
corporate VC (Table 1, panel B).  
 
 
23
 Brierley P. (2001) "The financing of technology-based small firms: a review of the literature" Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 41 
(1): 64-76. 
24
 
Lockett A., Murray G.C., and Wright M. (2002)  "Do UK venture capitalists still have a bias against investment in new technology firms?" Research Policy, 31 (6): 
1009-1030. 
25
 
Reynolds P.D., Bygrave W.D., Autio E., and Camp M. (2000) “Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Executive Report.” Kauffman Center for Entrepreneurial 
Leadership, Kansas City.  
26
 
European Venture Capital Association EVCA yearbook 2004.  EVCA: Brussels.
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Nine of the VCs are generalist investors with respect to sector preference, with no 
specialised biotech teams, while seven VCs are considered to be specialised investors in 
biotech (Table1, Panel C). The sample includes VCs that invested as little as €500,000 to 
as much as €194 million in biotech up to now. 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
We carefully select fund managers or senior investment managers for the 
interviews. They all have relevant experience in venture capital and more specifically in 
biotech investments. The interviewees were first contacted by phone; we additionally 
asked to prepare a questionnaire before the interview. If interviewees did not complete the 
questionnaire before the interview, we asked them to complete the questionnaire at the end 
of the interview. 
During the interview, the two interviewers follow a guideline to minimise 
interviewer effects. The interviews last between one hour and a half and two hours. All 
interviews are transcribed verbatim. To ensure validity of the transcription process, the 
interviews are taped and one of the interviewers takes notes. Next to the interview, we 
collect data from the written questionnaires. For each of the pre-investment mechanisms 
VCs may use to deal with risk or uncertainty, we ask whether VCs use more of these 
mechanisms for biotech investments compared to other technology-based investments. We 
record responses on a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 equals strongly disagree, 3 equals 
neither agree nor disagree and 5 equals strongly agree. To test whether the median 
response is statistically different from 3 we use the non-parametric Signed Rank Test27. 
 
 
 
27
 Non parametric test have several advantages over parametric test: non-parametric test are appropriate for small samples, make fewer 
assumptions about the data and are available to analyse data which are inherently in ranks (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). As the 
measurement level of the data is ordinal, we use a one-sample Signed Rank Test. Siegel S. and Castellan J.N. (1988) Non parametric 
statistics for the behavioural sciences, Mc Graw-Hill. 
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3 VENTURE CAPITALISTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE SPECIFIC BIOTECH 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Biotech is perceived to be one of the riskiest industries in our modern economy28. 
This is explained by the main characteristics of biotech companies. First, biotech is 
characterised by a lengthy process to develop a technology into a market ready product, 
especially in the drug development segment. The whole process from the discovery phase 
to a market ready product takes on average 15 years29. The long path to a market ready 
product has several consequences. First, biotech companies are confronted with high 
failure probabilities. In the biopharmaceutical sector, for example, only one out of 5,000 
compounds that emerge from pre-clinical testing is introduced on the market30. Consistent 
with Evans and Varaiya (2003), VCs in our sample perceive pre-market risks as an 
important risk factor for biotech companies. Eleven interviewees respond unprompted that 
technological failure or unsuccessful research projects are an important risk for biotech 
companies. A typical statement by interviewees is: 
 
“There is a lot of risk associated with other technologies, but it normally has to do 
with market conditions and competitive business practises, once the product is on 
the market. The risks for biotech companies are nearly always pre-market and they 
cause a lot more damage to companies.” (Later stage biotech specialist)   
 
Second, given the long time to market, the probability of a technology becoming 
obsolete increases. Ten interviewees state that maintaining a technological lead is a risk 
factor for biotech companies. Although intellectual property rights can protect a 
biotechnology company’s technology, they do not protect biotech companies against 
superior technologies or products developed by competitors, nor against direct competition 
from large pharmaceutical companies. The following quotes illustrate: 
 
 
28
 Senker J. (1998) Biotechnology and competitive advantage, Edward Elgar Publisher. 
29
 Evans A.G. and Varaiya N.P. (2003) "Anne Evans: Assessment of a biotech market opportunity" Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 28 (1): 87-105. 
30
 Evans A.G. and Varaiya N.P. (2003) "Anne Evans: Assessment of a biotech market opportunity" Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 28 (1): 87-105. 
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“The science may be good, you eventually may have a market ready product, 
which gets approval, but suddenly a new technology may rise only five years after 
your investment.” (Early and later stage biotech specialist) 
 
“A trend we clearly recognise the last two years is the way especially large 
pharmaceutical companies look at patents. … Companies do not hesitate today to 
challenge a patent, even if they know they will not win, but merely hope to silence 
a competitor.”  (Early stage generalist ) 
 
Third, biotech requires large amounts of financing31,32. An early stage specialist 
estimates that biotech start-ups require four to five times more capital at start than ICT 
start-ups. Ten interviewees consider financial risk and more specifically the high cash burn 
rates of biotech companies and the companies’ ability to attract future financing as an 
important risk factor.  
Finally, due to the long path to a market ready product in biotech, there is huge 
uncertainty about the potential exit route. Three interviewees explicitly mention higher 
uncertainty on a potential exit as a risk factor for biotech. A generalist investor states exit 
routes are often discussed before investing in an ICT company, while this is not possible 
in biotech. 
Next to the long path from technology to a market ready product, other risk factors 
are mentioned by the interviewees, for example regulatory issues. European biotech 
companies have to pass higher hurdles compared to their American counterparts because 
of regulatory fragmentation between countries. A biotech specialist highlights that the 
drug approval and reimbursements systems are still fragmented in the European Union. 
Further, a negative public opinion will usually not directly influence VCs’ investment 
decisions, but may influence their decision indirectly through its impact on governments 
and consequently on regulation. 
 
 
31
 Brierley P. (2001) "The financing of technology-based small firms: a review of the literature" Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 41 
(1): 64-76. 
32
 Evans A.G. and Varaiya N.P. (2003) "Anne Evans: Assessment of a biotech market opportunity" Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 28 (1): 87-105. 
 12
Finally, biotech technology and product development are more complex33. 
Understanding the technology and product development may present an extra difficulty, 
especially for generalist investors, but also for specialists. 
In summary, biotech investors identify three distinctive characteristics of biotech 
companies, namely a long path to a market ready product, regulatory difficulties and a 
technology which is difficult to understand. In the next section we discuss the impact of 
these distinctive characteristics on VCs’ selection process. 
 
4 VENTURE CAPITAL COMPANIES’ SELECTION PROCESS 
When discussing the VCs’ selection process for biotech proposals, the results are 
organised along the logical flow of the selection process of VCs (Figure 1). VCs receive 
hundreds of proposals a year. During the first rough screening phase, VCs check whether 
the proposals correspond to their investment strategy, which includes among other issues, 
target industries, preferred stages of development, geographical location and minimum 
and maximum size of investment. This quick exercise reduces the number of proposals 
significantly. Second, investment proposals that pass the screening phase are examined in 
more detail during the due diligence phase. Finally, the parties have to agree on the 
valuation of the investment proposal and contracts have to be signed. We discuss each of 
the stages separately. 
 
4.1. Investment strategy and initial screening  
One of the most radical ways to deal with the high risk environment is to exclude 
specific biotech proposals. This can either be based on the specific biotech segment, on the 
stage of development of the venture or on the VCs portfolio strategy. 
Ten VCs in our sample reject proposals from certain biotech segments without 
further scrutiny. First, because of the unclear regulatory environment and negative public 
opinion, biotechnology companies active in segments as genetically modified organisms 
and stam cell research may find it difficult to attract sufficient financing. Typical 
statements by interviewees are: 
 
 
33
 Brierley P. (2001) "The financing of technology-based small firms: a review of the literature" Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 41 
(1): 64-76. 
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“I would be interested to invest in plant biotech but the climate in Europe is 
against it. I think there is some very valuable research done in this segment, but 
the regulatory environment is the problem, not the companies, nor the companies’ 
business plans. Therefore we do not invest in that segment.” (Later stage biotech 
specialist) 
 
Second, the large financing needs of biopharmaceutical companies , make certain 
VCs unwilling to consider these ventures. This was expressed by one smaller VC as:  
 
“What we automatically exclude are drug discovery proposals. We do not have the 
funds for this. One has to leave this segment to the big players.” (Early and later 
stage generalist) 
 
Third, an exit is essential for VCs to realise a return on their investment. 
Difficulties surrounding the exit may cause VCs not to invest in particular biotech 
segments. For example, a later stage biotech specialist stated he has looked at 
neutraceutical companies in the past, but was unwilling to invest, because it is difficult to 
realise an exit in this sector. 
Next, given the difficulty to understand the biotech technology and product 
development, VCs lacking specialised teams may decide not to invest in particular biotech 
segments. As mentioned by several generalist investors: 
 
“If we cannot understand the biotech business plan, then we do not invest. One 
should not invest in what one does not understand.” (Early and later stage 
generalist)   
 
A second investment strategy followed by VCs is to exclude early stage proposals 
and focus on later stage deals. This is not specific for biotech investments, but consistent 
with the behaviour of VCs in other sectors. The advantage of focusing on later stage deals 
is that the later a VC invests in a company, the lower the technological and pre-market risk 
is, which is the most important risk for biotech companies according to our interviewees. 
Additionally, future financing needs and uncertainty surrounding the exit route may be 
lower. A typical statement is:  
 14
“We do not invest in seed. Companies should have gone trough the phase of one or 
two customers. The product should have proven itself.” (Later stage generalist) 
 
A third VC portfolio strategy is to diversify34,35. Financial theory states that when 
investors compose a portfolio of 10 to 15 lowly correlated investments, the portfolio risk is 
almost completely reduced to the systematic or market risk. Ten VCs diversify by 
investing in both technology and non-technology proposals, thereby assuming that the 
returns of technology and non-technology ventures are not highly correlated. On the other 
hand, two VCs invest exclusively in the biotech sector but diversify over the different 
biotech segments. Furthermore, VCs reduce the risk by investing in companies with 
multiple technology projects in the pipeline. According to the majority of investors, 
companies with only one technology project in the pipeline have to meet stricter criteria 
before they are deemed attractive. The following quotes illustrate the diversification 
strategy: 
 
“We try to offer our investors a balanced portfolio, therefore we diversify over 
sectors, but we also diversify within the biotech sector. If we have invested in one 
genomic company, we will not invest in another genomic company unless it is 
extremely  attractive.” (Early stage biotech specialist) 
 
“We reduce the technological risk by investing in companies which have several 
products in their pipeline. We do not like one-product companies.” (Early and 
later stage biotech specialist) 
 
Table 2 summarises the strategies investors use at the investment strategy and 
screening phase. Investors may exclude certain biotech sectors, invest in later stage deals 
and use a portfolio diversification strategy to deal with the specific biotech characteristics.   
Insert Table 2 About Here 
 
 
34
 Zacharakis A.L. and Meyer G.D. (2000) "The potential of actuarial decision models: Can they improve the venture capital investment 
decision?" Journal of Business Venturing, 15 (4): 323-346.  
35
 Norton E. and Tenenbaum B.H. (1993) "Specialization versus diversification as a venture capital investment strategy" Journal of 
Business Venturing, 8 (5): 431-442. 
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4.2. Due diligence 
4.2.1. The due diligence process 
Based on a five point Likert scale (see method section), we find that VCs in our 
sample agree that biotech proposals require significantly more extensive due diligence 
compared to other technology-based investment proposals (p-value: 0.0234). Generalist 
VCs outsource part of their due diligence to external parties, because they do not have 
sufficient knowledge to carry out the due diligence internally. Specialised VCs rely on 
specialised investment managers to reduce risk or uncertainty. As one interviewee stated: 
 
“We are a specialist investor because we have specialised people for each of the 
sectors we invest in. We will never invest in a company, if we have no one in our 
team who understands the business.” (Early stage biotech specialist) 
 
Specialised VCs, however, not solely rely on their internal investment managers. It 
is interesting to note that the importance of external validation is stressed even by VCs 
which are considered to be the leading Belgian specialists in biotech investments by their 
peers. Even the investment decision of highly specialised VCs is taking external 
information and validation into account. For example, some specialist investors mention 
that they are more keen to invest in a biotech company which has a strategic alliance, 
because it offers an external validation of the technology. This implies that internal and 
external information and validation are complements, rather than substitutes. 
 
4.2.2. Criteria 
Based on unprompted answers from the VCs we find that -in order of importance- 
financial elements, market, technology and entrepreneurial management team are the most 
important criteria within the due diligence phase of biotech companies. Our research leads 
to categories of investment criteria, which are consistent with previous research. We 
report, however, some differences in the relative importance of the different categories 
with previous research36,37,38,39,40.  
 
 
36
 Zacharakis A.L. and Meyer G.D. (2000) "The potential of actuarial decision models: Can they improve the venture capital investment 
decision?" Journal of Business Venturing, 15 (4): 323-346.  
37
 MacMillan I.C., Siegel R., and Subbanarasimha P.N.S. (1985) "Criteria used by venture capitalists to evaluate new venture 
proposals" Journal of Business Venturing, 1 (1): 119-128. 
38
 Fried V.H. and Hisrich R.D. (1994) "Towards a model of venture capital investment decision making" Financial Management, 23 
(3): 28-37. 
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First, nine VCs mention financial elements as the most important requirement of a 
business plan. VCs require a business plan with a complete financial plan based on 
realistic assumptions. This is somewhat inconsistent with VCs assertion that it is 
extremely difficult to forecast the future of a biotech venture, given technological and 
market uncertainties. VCs nevertheless require biotech entrepreneurs to seriously consider 
these financial elements. 
VCs look beyond the current financing round: they anticipate follow-on financing 
and even require that sufficient funding is guaranteed to develop a venture before they 
invest in it. This, again, puts a strong burden on the venture, as it may lead to a chicken-
and-egg problem. Early stage VCs require that the full investment cycle is laid out, while 
later stage VCs only want to commit themselves when the technology and market have 
been proven. As one interviewee stated: 
 
“There is a risk that investors underestimate the amount of funds needed to 
develop the business. In that case, they get stuck somewhere in the middle of the 
process of creating a valuable business. This is a very important risk for us and 
this risk is more important for biotech compared to other businesses.“ (Early and 
later stage generalist) 
 
VCs further clearly fear dilution in subsequent financing rounds. This can largely 
be explained by the large financing needs of biotech companies. 
Second, market strategy is seen as a key requirement of a biotech business plan by 
eight VCs. Because of the high risks and uncertainties within the biotech sector, VCs 
require a well-developed market model. Entrepreneurs are forced to think thoroughly 
about the following questions before seeking support from VCs: Who will the company’s 
customers be? What will the company offer? How will the company create value?   
Third, six VCs mention IP strategy as an important prerequisite of a biotech 
investment. VCs reckon they focus more on IP strategy for biotech ventures compared to 
other technology-based ventures. Intellectual property rights are important, especially 
because they offer an external validation of the uniqueness of the technology and 
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consequently reduce at least partially the uncertainty surrounding the technology. 
Intellectual property rights are further a requirement to be able to realise an appropriate 
return, although they offer no guarantee for success. As previously discussed, intellectual 
property rights do not protect biotech companies against superior, competing technologies 
or products and are not always effective in protecting the biotech companies against large 
competitors. 
The venture capital literature often suggests that it is the entrepreneurial 
management team, irrespective of other criteria, who fundamentally determines the 
investment decision of a VC. Much has been made in the venture capital literature on the 
importance of a quality management team41,42,43. Our findings do not support the prime 
importance of the management team, however, as only six VCs mention the 
entrepreneurial management team as an important requirement of a biotech business plan. 
We find that management is a more important factor for later stage investors than for early 
stage investors. A VC explains:  
 
“What one sees more often in biotech compared to other tech companies is that a 
biotech company evolves in two phases. In a first phase, a university professor has 
an idea and becomes an entrepreneur. In a second phase, the company has 
something that starts to look like a product. At that point in time, deals with 
customers have to be generated, …and scientists are generally not good at this. 
Management has to change as the company evolves…In the beginning they have to 
be very good in science and at the end they have to be able to sell, to close 
deals,….” (Early and later stage generalist) 
 
Our results support the finding of Clarysse et al. (2005) that early stage biotech 
investors focus more often on technology criteria than on management team criteria44. 
Although early stage VCs accept purely scientific teams, scientific entrepreneurs should 
be willing to step down as CEO when the company evolves to the market stage. In line 
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with Hellmann and Puri (2002), VCs may play an important role in bringing outsiders into 
the position of CEO45. The following quote illustrates: 
 
“If we are confronted with a university professor who has absolutely no 
management talent but thinks he has it, then we will not invest…We are willing to 
invest in companies with an incomplete management team, if we have an influence 
[on the HR policy] and can do the recruiting.” (Early stage specialist) 
 
In summary, contrary to previous research, early stage investors do not require a 
complete management team from the start, but require to have an impact on the future 
composition of the management team, as the biotech company develops. Later stage 
investors, however, require a high quality and well balanced management team. 
 
4.3. Valuation 
A critical element in the negotiation process between the VC and the entrepreneur 
is the valuation of the business. A valuation is necessary to determine the required 
ownership percentage of the VC. Ten interviewees mention that they use discounted cash 
flow (DCF) and ten mention the use of multiples to value biotech proposals. This result is 
consistent with earlier studies on the valuation techniques used by VCs in Continental 
Europe46. The biotech setting clearly affects the valuation process of VCs. First, VCs find 
it harder to value biotech companies compared to other technology-based companies (p-
value: 0.0039), but we find no evidence that VCs require higher hurdle rates contrary to 
expectations (p-value: 0.1211). This may be explained by an increased probability of 
adverse selection, should VCs increase the required hurdle rate. Similar to banks, who are 
unable to raise interest rates indefinitely, VCs may not be able to raise cut-off rates of 
returns indefinitely, as high-quality companies will look for cheaper financing sources and 
the average or low-quality companies will be the only ones willing to accept the excessive 
conditions of the VC47. This results in VCs developing a strategy not to invest in high risk 
proposals, rather than increasing their required return. 
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Second, multiples and DCF may be the most commonly used valuation techniques 
for other technology-based and non-technology-based investments48, but they are less 
frequently used for valuing biotech investments. VCs believe multiples do not offer 
realistic and stable values in the case of biotech ventures. Using a P/E multiple on the 
current earnings of a biotech company, for example, often leads to a negative value. 
Although the DCF model theoretically holds in the biotech setting, half of our respondents 
indicate that the DCF method is more frequently used for valuing other technology-based 
companies. This contrasts with Barrow et al. (2001), who reported that VCs switch to the 
DCF method if the assumptions of the multiples method do not hold49. Instead of using the 
traditional quantitative models to value a company, VCs tend to rely more heavily on 
qualitative measures to value a biotech proposal. Two generalist VCs even call it mere 
guesswork. 
Given the lack of a standard valuation tool, the difficulty to assess the future in a 
biotech setting and the VCs’ reliance on qualitative measures, it is not surprising that the 
most important reason why negotiations break down is disagreement concerning the value 
of the proposal. Ten interviewees mention they failed to close a deal due to disagree on 
valuation on at least one occasion in the previous three years. Furthermore, differences in 
risk perception between VCs and entrepreneurs make it even more difficult to agree on 
valuation. All VCs agree there are important differences in risk perception: entrepreneurs 
underestimate the risks. This was expressed by one interviewee as follows: 
 
“When the technology is validated, a lot of entrepreneurs assume they reached the 
finish. What they do not realise is that the story here only begins.” (Early and later 
stage biotech specialist) 
 
VCs attribute this difference in risk perception to entrepreneurs who are 
emotionally bounded to the project and underestimate risks in their enthusiasm, while VCs 
are experienced and therefore more realistic. VCs have seen numerous entrepreneurs, who 
are certain their invention will be extremely successful, but who eventually fail to become 
star performers. According to six interviewees, differences in risk perception are even 
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stronger for biotech entrepreneurs than for other technology-based entrepreneurs. VCs 
attribute this greater difference to the long development path to turn technology into a 
market ready product and more specifically the larger financing needs and higher risks 
because of this lengthy process.  
 
4.4. Contracting 
A well-documented way to reduce agency risk is to use extensive contracts50,51. 
Given the high risk environment, we expect that biotech investors write more extensive 
contracts, as this restricts the entrepreneur from taking actions to the detriment of the 
principal, in this case the VC. However, we find no evidence that VCs require more 
extensive contracts for biotech investments compared to other technology-based 
investments. First, the Likert scales indicate that VCs do not require more or more detailed 
contract specifications for biotech investments compared to other technology-based 
investments (p-value: 0.1875). Second, VCs may use remuneration and bonding strategies, 
i.e. arrangements that penalise entrepreneurs if they make decisions which are not in the 
interest of outside investors52. Appropriate remuneration and bonding strategies, which tie 
the payoff of the entrepreneur to that of the VC, can prevent moral hazard or ex post 
changes in behaviour to the detriment of the principal. However, we do not find that 
biotech investors require more alignment of management incentives through appropriate 
remuneration and bonding strategies for biotech investments compared to other 
technology-based investments (p-value: 0.6250). Next, preferred and/or convertible stock 
may be used in order to stimulate the entrepreneur to perform well and protect investors, 
as entrepreneurs generally hold common stock53. Again, VCs in our sample do not use 
more preferred and/or convertible stock for biotech investments compared to other 
technology-based investments (p-value: 0.7500).  
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The results from the Likert scales are consistent with the information collected 
from the interviews. Agency risk is neither mentioned directly nor indirectly by the 
majority of VCs interviewed. This indicates that agency risk is not necessarily (perceived 
to be) higher in biotech, but that uncertainty for both the VC and entrepreneur plays a 
more dominant role. In highly volatile, high R&D-intensive industries, where the actual 
outcome of a business is not necessarily determined by management commitment and 
competence, shifting risk beyond the control of the entrepreneurs from investors to 
entrepreneurs will be deemed as unfair and will therefore be expensive from the VCs’ 
point of view. Our results are in line with incomplete contract theory, which states that 
incomplete contracts are negotiated because of uncertainty and more attention is paid to 
active involvement in the investment ex-post54.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Previous research on UK VCs has shown that VCs use stricter selection criteria for 
technology-based companies compared to non-technology-based companies. We focus on 
how the typical characteristics of biotech companies influence the selection process of 
Belgian VCs. The biotech setting is chosen because it represents an interesting setting to 
study the supply of financing under extreme circumstances. There is a long development 
path to turn a technology into a market ready product, there are issues of regulatory 
uncertainty, negative public opinion and difficulty to understand the technology and 
product development.  These are distinctive characteristics of biotech ventures. 
Table 2 summarises the main findings of our study. The VCs’ investment decision 
process usually starts with a rough screening to examine whether the proposal meets the 
VCs’ investment strategy. The most radical way in which VCs deal with the particularities 
of biotech companies is to define an investment strategy that excludes certain biotech 
segments or investment stages, in order to reduce the risk or uncertainty inherent to 
biotech. 
Proposals that fit the investment strategy and pass the screening phase are 
examined in more detail during the due diligence process. VCs combine information from 
the business plan with internal knowledge and information from external sources.  
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Our results indicate that even highly specialised teams stress the importance of 
external validation. As a consequence, internal and external validation are complements, 
rather than substitutes.  
Financial, market and technology criteria are important investment criteria. 
Management is especially important for later stage investors. This is explained by the 
lengthy process of turning technology into a market ready product. During the company’s 
early stages of development, scientific progress is more important than market 
development. Later in the company’s development, management and sales skills become 
more important. As a consequence, most early stage investors are willing to invest in 
biotech companies with an incomplete, purely scientific team as long as VCs have the 
freedom to recruit managers when necessary. One may assume that investment criteria 
differ between different types of investors. However, given our small sample size it is 
difficult to draw conclusions hereupon. This leads to the following proposition, to be 
tested in future research: 
 
Proposition 1: The selection criteria used by VCs depend on the characteristics of 
the investment proposal (e.g. stage of development, sector) and of the investor (e.g. 
independent versus captive, generalist versus specialist). 
 
VCs further reckon that IP is more important for biotech companies compared to 
other technology-based companies. VCs see IP rights as a requirement to invest, but 
realise that it is no guarantee for success. IP rights are not able to protect biotech 
companies in all cases, for example, against superior substitutes or against legal attacks 
from large pharmaceutical companies. We suspect that VCs nevertheless focus so much on 
IP rights, because next to the limited protection they offer, they provide an external 
validation of the uniqueness of the technology. Finally, given the large financing need and 
long development path to a market ready product, VCs focus extensively on future 
financing rounds.  
Next, valuation is essential to determine the required ownership percentage of a 
VC. VCs rely more on qualitative methods to value biotech investments compared to other 
technology-based companies. Contrary to expectations, we do not find that VCs require 
higher hurdle rates to compensate for higher risk or uncertainty. Valuation is nevertheless 
the most important stumbling block during negations between VCs and entrepreneurs. The 
discrepancy in perceived value between the entrepreneur and biotech investor is reinforced 
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by differences in risk perception. All VCs agree that entrepreneurs underestimate the risks. 
Our results offer a clear call for more research on valuation in highly uncertain 
environments.  
Finally, contracting is a mechanism to reduce agency risk. Contrary to expectations 
based on agency theory, we do not find that VCs require more complete contracts for 
biotech ventures compared to other technology-based companies. This can be explained 
by incomplete contract theory: under high uncertainty, the parties in a contract are not able 
to include all contingencies. This might be an indication that agency risk is not (perceived 
as) higher in biotech, but that uncertainty for both the entrepreneur and VC plays a more 
dominant role. Incomplete contract theory predicts that higher uncertainty, which a VC 
cannot reduce through more thorough contracting, will be tackled by increased monitoring 
post-investment55 5]. This leads to following proposition:  
 
Proposition 2: VCs require the same standard contractual terms in highly 
uncertain environments as in less uncertain environments, but manage the 
uncertainty by more post-investment monitoring and governance.  
 
A limitation of the present study is that it focuses only on the supply side in the 
investor-investee relationship. We have not discussed the VCs’ investment decision 
process with biotech and other technology-based entrepreneurs. It might well be that 
entrepreneurs view the decision process of VCs differently than the VCs themselves. 
Second, given our small sample size it is difficult to distinguish between different types of 
VCs. With respect to valuation, for example, we find that the two bank related VCs use is 
the so-called venture capital method to value biotech companies. It is however difficult to 
conclude that bank related VCs use more financially-related and quantitative valuation 
methods compared to the other VCs who use more qualitative measures. These two bank 
related VCs are both later stage investors and more quantitative measures may be used 
simply because of reduced uncertainty in later stage investment proposals.  
Our results are especially important for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs should realise 
that an excellent technology is a necessary, but insufficient condition to attract the 
attention of investors.  
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Entrepreneurs have to demonstrate their investor readiness by offering, on top of a 
solid IP strategy, a sound market analysis and a realistic financial plan to VCs. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs of young biotech companies must be willing to change 
position over time as the company develops. It is not because the entrepreneur is a star 
scientist, that (s)he has sufficient talent to lead the company through the different stages of 
development, which require distinct qualifications. Finally, entrepreneurs should have 
realistic expectations with respect to the value of the venture when approaching external 
equity investors.  
Finally our results are important for policymakers. High tech companies are 
considered to be important drivers for economic development. VC represents an important 
source of funding for the development of biotech companies. Our study offers important 
recommendations to policy makers in order to bring VCs and biotech entrepreneurs closer 
together. First, more coherence is needed at a European level. Existing regulatory market 
fragmentation due to differences in drug approval and reimbursement systems are barriers 
that are especially difficult to overcome for European entrepreneurial biotech companies. 
They are at a competitive disadvantage compared to their American competitors. These 
barriers should therefore be removed. Further, increasing the investor readiness of 
entrepreneurs, especially with respect to market development and financial issues, is badly 
needed. Educational and support services could be set up to assist in these areas. 
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FIGURE 1 
The selection process of a venture capital investment * 
 
 
 
* Our study focuses on the VCs activities after deal generation and before the actual 
investment.  
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FIGURE 2 
Investments in biotechnology as a percentage of GDP 
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TABLE 1 
Overview of the sample by investment stage and type of investor 
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Seed 9  Independent quoted VC 2 Specialist investor 7 
Start-up 12  Independent private VC 8 Generalist investor 9 
Expansion 10  University related VC 3   
Replacement capital 3  Bank related VC 2   
Buyout 3  Strategic investor 1   
Note: Venture capital funds may invest in different stages of the investment cycle. 
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TABLE 2 
The impact of biotech characteristics on the selection process of venture capitalists 
Venture capitalists’ selection process Strategy to manage biotech characteristics Biotech characteristics 
Investment strategy and screening  
-Exclude specific biotech sectors 
-Regulatory difficulties 
-Long path to a market ready product and large financing needs 
-Difficulty to understand 
-Exclude stages of investment -Risk and uncertainty 
-Use portfolio strategy: 
• diversify within technology and non-technology  sectors 
• diversify within the biotech sector 
• preference for companies with multiple technology products in pipeline 
-Risk and uncertainty 
Due diligence 
-Process: internal and external validation as complements  -Difficulty to understand technology 
-Criteria:  
 
• financial criteria -Large financing needs over long path to a market ready product 
• market criteria -Long path to market ready product 
• IP criteria -Difficulty to understand 
• willingness to change team (early stage deals) 
-Long path to a market ready product 
• complete management team (later stage deals) 
Valuation 
-Qualitative valuation measures rather than quantitative valuation methods 
-Large financing needs over a long path to a market ready 
product 
-Risky and uncertain 
-No higher hurdle rates  
Contracting -Contracts not more complete -Not more agency risk 
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